

871
65 One significant development in the control of education by the Communist government is the role played by the Party. Although the official chain of control as shown in Chart 3 seems to have no place for the Communist Party, Party branches on all levels are actually the authorities for interpretation of official policy and have the final decision on how a school should be run. Evidence shows that some schools report every important question to the local Party secretary before taking any action.²¹ Close-range Party supervision, together with the assignment of well trained veteran cadres to key positions on the administrative staff of the school, serve to maintain the Communists' control over the educational system.

III. MAJOR MOVEMENTS LAUNCHED BY COMMUNIST IN EDUCATION

871
68 A. "Thought Reform"

To effect an ideological revolution among the educators and students is an essential step in the Communist plan to "Sovietize" the educational system in China. Since 1949, every major measure adopted by the Peking regime

21. People's Education, Dec. 1954, p. 30.

873 theory of education. A broad program for this purpose was outlined at the All-China Conference on Education for Peasants and Workers by Ch'ien Chün-jui, Vice-Minister of Education, on September 30, 1950.⁵² He quoted Mao Tse-tung as saying that, because the peasants and workers constituted over 80 per cent of China's population, they were the main force upon which would depend the transition of Chinese society from "New Democracy" to Socialism. Ch'ien stressed the following points: (1) The most immediate task was to combat illiteracy. (2) The cadres among the peasants and workers must be the first to be educated so that they would provide proper leadership for the masses. (3) This type of education must be fitted to local conditions which might vary from place to place.

- [665] No line of demarcation can be clearly drawn between the educational institutions for peasants and workers and those for Party and other government cadres. Altogether these schools form a part of the regular school system. As Ch'eng Fang-wu, former president of the College of the War of Resistance at Yen-an, reported in July 1952,⁵³ the development

52. People's Education, May 1951, pp. 12-16.

53. Ibid., July 1952, p. 6.

- 823 For political cadres, regardless of their own
• 665 professions, study of Marxian and other
Communist theories are required. The Central
Committee of the Communist Party periodically
issues directives listing the works of Marx,
Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung to be studied. Chiefs
of local Party branches are charged with the
responsibility of supervising these studies at
weekly meetings. 56

873 Classes to teach beginners to read the
Chinese language are held separately, but once
the students have graduated from these classes
they are given the opportunity to advance to
higher levels of learning. An attempt is made
to raise the academic level of cadres among
peasants and workers to that of graduates of
regular schools. In a directive issued by the
Communist Party on December 24, 1953, 57
it was stated that those who pursued spare-time
study at least six hours a week for forty weeks
a year, covering the essential courses pre --
scribed for the primary school level by
educational authorities, were entitled to enroll
in a junior secondary school. Three years of

56. A sample list of materials to be studied
is found in People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 535-36.

57. Ibid., p. 538.

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871 In addition, 130,000 minority nationals attended
563 spare-time schools in the same year. In
1952, the enrollment of regular middle schools
and colleges for minority nationalities in
Southwest China increased to 10,000. There
were also 694 primary schools with 200,000
students.⁶¹ By 1952, the three colleges for
minority nationalities had graduated 3,000
students. The special courses arranged for
minority cadres had graduated 25,000 students,
including 379 women.⁶²

871 The Communists claimed that their policy
563 of providing educational opportunities for
186 minority nationalities had met with warm
reception. At the same time, the Communists
also admitted difficulties in convincing the
minority peoples with their "benevolent"
intentions. At Ma-erh-k'ang in western Szechwan
Province, the establishment of a primary school
at the beginning was eyed by the local people
with suspicion. Parents were hesitant to send
their children to school for fear that the school
was going to take their children away from
home. It was after much persuasion that more
parents began to let their children attend school,
increasing the enrollment from 40 in 1951
to 126 in 1954.⁶³

61. Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain,
pp. 17-19.

62. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

63. Primary School Teacher, Sept. 1954,
p. 20.

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VII. OTHER GROUPS

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184 In addition to the groups discussed, there are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes have significant bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibited intense feelings of Party loyalty and dedication to the "cause" in the early days of their careers, and so far there has been no indication that their feelings have changed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, the top Communist leaders in Southwest China have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrupting Party harmony and hegemony. Those who contributed to the victory of the Communists received assignment commensurate with their service, and they seem to remain active and content with their positions.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to repeatedly prove their loyalty to the Communist regime. The fact that the Party relies

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665 on close surveillance and an atmosphere of
184 fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction and dissidence within the Party ranks. The expansion of a bureaucracy necessitates the promotion of numerous lower-level Party functionaries. This certainly tends to make the old Party cadres resentful when they see the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for advancement.

Former Nationalist officials had their darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. Even former warlords who has chosen to co-operate with the Communists have been assigned government positions without true authority, but which at least insure their livelihood and prestige. A sense of insecurity may continue to affect some members of this group, but as time goes on they will consolidate their positions in the "new" society.

VIII. CONCLUSION

184 The Communist system of multiple control, which extends to all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 2c,
Political Background

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

665 The fundamental aim of the Chinese Communist regime is to concentrate all political power in the hands of the Communist Party of China. This fact has determined the pattern of political dynamics in Southwest China. Political dynamics is concerned with political power and the political process. Since political power is monopolized by the Communist Party of China, and since the political process is patterned upon the controls exercised by the Party, the study of political dynamics is little more than a study of the Party itself and its methods of political control, together with a study of the role and policies of minor parties. The power structure is such that the decision-making process follows a course largely determined by the organizational and operational pattern of the Party. Through a well-established network of control over organizations of all types, political activities are regulated and guided by the Party. Thus, it is the Party, not society, that generates the vitality which shapes the political process. In order to determine the course which society will follow the Party

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665 must control closely all types of political organizations and make use of all available instruments of coercion.

A campaign¹ is one of the political devices used by the Party to implement its decisions. Since it calls for concerted action by all groups and organizations, a campaign also can be used to test the loyalty and effectiveness of those taking part in it. It may be carried on at both a national and a local level and directed at either the entire population or a segment of it.²

Governmental and Party centralization is another factor which determines the pattern of political dynamics in Southwest China. The Party maintains control over local authorities by four major means: (1) maintenance of a unified and effective Party organization within the region; (2) close supervision of regional administrative and judicial organizations, armed forces, public security agencies, and

1. For a discussion of campaigns, see Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism, the First Five Years, Yale University Press, 1955, pp. 77-100; W. W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China, Cambridge, 1955, pp. 72-98.

2. Typical drives of a local nature are those (continued next page)

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45 People's procuratorates; (3) control of all mass organizations; (4) instigation of movements and campaigns designed to arouse popular enthusiasm and manipulate public opinion.

I. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANS

A. The Present Status of the Party in South- west China

Two facts must be kept in mind when discussing Communist activities in Southwest China. First, the Communist Party always has been relatively weak in this region. Second, the region was one of the last to be conquered by the Communist armies. Although there was some Communist activity in certain areas during the early 1930's, the Party was weak in the cities and had almost no strength in the countryside. Not until 1952 did the Communists begin to build up a strong Party organization. Prior to that time the Party relied primarily upon its military forces and

2. (continued) conducted in farming communities: Spring Plowing, Summer Collection, Resist Drought, Resist Flood, Autumn Harvest, and others.

- 665 the co-operation of the New Democratic Youth Corps, a Party affiliate, for the implementation of its policies. There was little Party activity in the rural areas. In fact, only 7 per cent of the hsiang (groups of villages) had Party organizations.³ One of the first steps taken by the Party was to create Party branches in rural areas and establish close control over all rural organizations. This resulted in a general tightening of Party control over the whole region.

In spite of the many handicaps that confronted it in the Southwest, the Party quickly accomplished its basic objectives. The land reform program was merely one of many campaigns brought to successful completion by the end of 1952. Since that time the regional Party organization, operating under the close control of Peking, has carried out Party directives with increasing speed and efficiency. Three things are clear: (1) the

3. Report of Yu Chiang-chen, head of the Department of Organization of the Southwest China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Hsin-hua Daily [New China Daily], Oct. 23, 1952, p. 1.

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regional Party organization is extremely flexible and is being adjusted and expanded continually in order that it may cope with the many tasks assigned it; (2) Since 1952 the Party has maintained a concerted drive to increase its total membership. It is especially anxious to attract more workers, technicians, and managers into its ranks; (3) Party members continually are exposed to a thorough indoctrination and training program, which imposes upon them the duty of constant rectification and reform. Party organizations are periodically overhauled and reorganized.

B. Party Organization

Three principles governing Party organization should be borne in mind: (1) Party organization is an integrated system, which symbolizes the extreme centralization of political power and the fullest demand for unity and discipline. (2) Party organization is pyramidal in structure and is erected on a territorial and functional basis. (3) Party organization is flexible.

Prior to 1955, the organization of the Communist Party of China in Southwest China was divided into two parts: (a) the delegates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the region and (b) the local party bodies extending from the provincial

• 665 party layer down to the hsiang (group of villages) level. Since the abolition of the Southwest regional government in June 1954, the need for the Southwest Party Bureau has diminished. Although the abolition of the bureau has not yet been announced, bureau representatives, with the exception of those from the Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang bureaus, were not present at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China held in March 1955 and the 6th Plenary Session (enlarged) of the 7th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in October 1955.⁴ Presumably, the bureau organization in the different regions no longer exists. However, since the Party bureau had long been active in regional politics, and since it can be established at the will of the Central Committee of the Party, some explanation of its operation seems necessary.

Delegates to the Central Committee.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party

4. Reports on the conference and the plenary session are found in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin (London), No. 1278, April 7, 1955, p. 4; and ibid., No. 1413, October 18, 1955, pp. 6-7.

• 665 was represented in Southwest China by the Southwest Bureau. Prior to the formation of the Szechwan Provincial Government in 1952, the bureau had direct jurisdiction over the provincial Party organizations in Kweichow, Yunnan, and Sikiang, and the four special districts Party organizations in Szechwan. The local Party bodies are divided into tiers from provincial Party organizations to administrative district, county and city, ch'u (district) and hsiang.

The Party bureau exercised its authority through two channels, the bureau secretariat, an executive organ, enjoyed power comparable to that of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Its standing departments were: organization, propaganda, rural work, urban work, social affairs, united front; its commission dealt with trade unions, youth, and women; it also had offices of policy planning, military affairs, and other functions.

The bureau has not hesitated to use the regional Party conference for the transmission of directives and for periodic controls. In

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- 665 the past few years, the bureau convened many enlarged cadre conferences and administrative, joint district-secretariat sessions. Bureau departments might also call their own sessions, thereby placing the different Party secretariats directly under their respective jurisdictions.

C. Local Party Hierarchy⁵

1. Provincial Party Layer. The provincial Party organization is the highest layer of the Party hierarchy within a province. Its first obligation is to enforce the directives and decrees transmitted to it by the Central Party. As will be seen, the provincial and city/county layers have a mixed party-governmental function while the administrative district and ch'u layers are primarily concerned with the Party.

2. Administrative District Party Layer. The Party unit at this layer generally

5. For local Party organizations, consult the Constitution of the Communist Party of China; English text in Liu Shao-ch'i, On the Party, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1951, pp. 185-90.

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• 665 corresponds with that of an administrative district under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. Its great importance derives from the following facts: (a) its major work is Party affairs; (b) owing to administrative requirements, its functionaries are allowed some initiative and independence. For example, it holds authority in the selection and placement of personnel -- Party as well as governmental -- within its jurisdiction.

3. County and City Party Layer. This layer of organization corresponds to the county and city governments. Like the provincial Party agencies, the county and city Party units have the dual tasks of carrying out Party work and of securing complete control over other administrative and mass organizations.

4. Ch'u Layer. Party bodies are installed below a city or county irrespective of the ch'u organization. Like the administrative district Party agencies, ch'u Party units are directly responsible for the management of Party affairs and the implementation of Party policy.

5. Hsiang Layer. This is the lowest layer of the local Party hierarchy. It is here that the Party and government fusion is most obvious and the Party control over other

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665 administrative and mass organizations most clearly revealed.

In addition to the territorial division of Party organization -- the central delegate to the region and the local Party hierarchy -- there is an organization known as the Party branch or Party cell, which acts as a link between the Party and the masses in all organizations. Party branches are organized in any factory, mine, village, enterprise, street, army, government office, or school, wherever there are three or more Party members. Branches can be grouped into general branches and Party groups, depending largely upon the number of members and the place of function.

D. Organization

In each of these constituent party units, quadripartite division of authority is maintained: the Party Congress, the Party Committee, the Control Committee, and the Party Conference.

1. Party Congress. The Party Congress of each unit is the highest organization of that unit. In theory, Party congresses at all local levels meet every two years; in fact, the National Party Congress has not convened since 1945, and local Party congresses as

- 665 such have not been held. But theoretically, in order to carry out its announced function of supervising the Party Committee, the Party Congress hears and approves or disapproves the Committee's report, decides on questions pertaining to that area, and elects members of the Party Committee on its level and delegates to the Party congress at the immediately higher level, subject to the approval of the Party Committee at that higher level.

2. Party Committee. The executive body of the Party unit on each level is the Party Committee, whose power is concentrated. At the provincial level, power within the Party Committee is further centralized in a Standing Committee which has the same permanent and temporary functional departments and working commissions as the Party bureaus. The Party Committee convenes Party conferences between sessions of Party congresses and sets up various subordinate Party organizations, allocates Party personnel and finance, and directs the work of Party agents in non-Party organizations.

• 665

Although Party committees in the district and below have no standing committee, power within the committee is further centralized in the hands of secretaries. Certain basic departments and commissions form the backbone of the committee. The operational aspect of the Party Committee is uniform at all levels, in the sense that all committees adhere to democratic-centralism and other basic centralized devices characteristic of the Communist Party.

3. Control Committee. The National Party Conference⁶ of the Communist Party of China held in March 1955 established new Control Committees to replace the Discipline Inspection Committees established in November 1949. The change was made necessary because of the need for an intensified drive toward socialism and as a campaign against corruption and laxity in the Party. Members of the committees are elected by the Party congresses or conferences of the respective levels, subject to the approval of the Party

6. English text in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin, No. 1277, April 6, 1955, p. 3.

- 665 committees of the next higher levels. Local control committees are also subject to the supervision and direction of the higher control committees. They may set up branch offices. Their relationship is centralized and permits no deviation.

4. Party Conference. The Party Conference in fact is an executive meeting. Convened by the Party Committee on a higher level, it is attended by representatives of Party committees on lower levels. Unlike the delegates to the Party congresses who are elected at large, representatives to the conferences are appointed by their own Party committees. The conference has the power to appoint or remove up to one-fourth of the members of the Party committee convening the conference and to reach decisions on Party work within its jurisdiction.

E. Party Expansion

The Communist Party has conducted two major membership drives in Southwest China. The first was launched in 1952 and the second in 1955. Prior to 1952 the Party was

- 665 extremely weak in the Southwest and had failed to win appreciable popular support. Party leaders believed that this situation had resulted from the failure of the Party to increase its membership in the region. Only 7 per cent of the hsiang had Party organizations; at the ch'u level, Party organizations were few in number and generally ineffective.⁷ The situation was even worse in the cities. It was reported that between 1950 and 1952 Party organizations in Chungking had admitted only 300 new members.⁸ In some Party organizations not a single new member had been admitted during this period. Local Party leaders were accused of neglecting expansion work and seeking to make the Party a closed caste.

In order to remedy this situation the Party launched its great membership drive of 1952. The goal of this drive was the creation of a Party branch in every village and the expansion of Party organizations in factories, schools, and government offices.

7. The New China Daily, Aug. 9, 1952, p. 3; Oct. 23, 1952, p. 1.

8. Ibid., Sept. 3, 1952.

45 In October 1952 the Southwest China Party Bureau issued a directive⁹ outlining four tasks to be undertaken by all Party organizations: (1) Party members must be organized into groups for the study of documents on Party expansion; (2) all organizations above administrative district Party committees must form inspection teams to supervise the expansion work of lower Party organizations; (3) all organizations must publish directives and pamphlets on Party expansion and make them available for mass circulation; (4) monthly reports on the progress of the membership drive must be submitted to the Central Committee of the Party.

This directive was elaborated by Yü Chiang-chen, chief of the Department of Organization of the Party Bureau. Yü instructed Party secretaries to organize teams led by responsible Party members and to promote Party expansion in villages and factories. He also called for the organization of temporary ch'ü Party branches wherever possible and greater efforts on the part of the Department of Organization and the Discipline Inspection Committee. He pointed out that the success of the membership drive

9. Ibid., Oct. 18, 1952, p. 1.

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- 665 depended upon the enthusiasm and sense of responsibility of individual Party members, especially those employed in the Department of Organization who were charged with conducting the drive.¹⁰

The first membership drive brought thousands of new members into the Party. Four months after the beginning of the drive Szechwan had filled over 7 per cent of its quota. Chungking alone contributed 3,000 new Party members.¹¹ The campaign in Kweichow netted even greater gains -- 11,000 new members.¹² Government offices contributed the largest number of new Party members (35%), followed by rural areas (18%), factories (9%), commercial establishments (9%), and schools (6%). New members were selected from among 220,000 activists recommended by trade unions, the New Democratic Youth Corps, and other organizations.¹³ Special training schools were established for their instruction and indoctrination.

10. Ibid., Oct. 23, 1952, p. 1.

11. Ibid., Nov. 22, 1952, p. 1.

12. Ibid., Nov. 13, 1952, p. 1.

13. Ibid., Nov. 22, 1952, p. 1.

- 665. During 1953 and 1954 the membership of the Party continued to increase. The growth of industry in the Southwest and the national campaign for the creation of agricultural co-operatives provided an environment favorable to Party expansion. By June 1954 there were 117,536 Party members serving in rural areas.¹⁴ Recently conquered Yunnan contributed 30,000 new members to this total.¹⁵ Expansion also took place in the cities. Between 1953 and 1955 over 8,000 new members were admitted into the Party's Chungking branch.¹⁶ In the factories almost 10 per cent of the workers were Party members. Members usually were selected from among the most skilled and experienced workers. Four hundred and sixty nine new Party branches were organized.

During this period the Party also sought to attract members of ethnic minorities into its ranks. There are over 18,000,000 of these minority peoples, scattered over the

14. People's Daily, June 6, 1954, p. 3.

15. Ibid., Oct. 23, 1954, p. 5.

16. Ibid., June 30, 1954, p. 3; Survey of China Mainland Press, U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 1018 (Supplement), April 15, 1955, p. 34.

- 665 entire Southwest. Their close ties with communities in Southeast Asia enhance their value to the Party (See chapter on Ethnic Groups.) In November 1954, 5,000 members of ethnic minorities residing in Yunnan became Party members.¹⁷ Most had been members of Party organization teams or were graduates of the Institution for Nationality Groups.

These efforts to increase Party membership in the Southwest were accelerated by the inauguration of a national membership drive in 1955. Under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Party teams sought to increase Party membership in rural areas. At that time, the Party had over 4,000,000 members in rural areas and had established Party branches in 70 per cent of the hsiang.¹⁸ At present, Party membership is expanding rapidly.

F. Party Overhauling

Party overhauling generally involves

17. Ibid., Nov. 28, 1954, p. 1.

18. People's Daily, March 9, 1955, p. 1.

- 665 four major activities: (1) rectification, 19 a step which involves examination and the political education of Party members; (2) review and criticism of Party members' work; (3) arousal of mass interest in the criticism of Party members, and (4) increased study.

The examination of individual Party members centers upon the eight conditions set forth by the Party and upon the San Ch'a ("three checks" principle). The eight conditions required of a Party member have been set forth in the Party's Constitution. They include the realization of the ultimate goal of the Party, devotion to the cause and interest of the Party, and absolute obedience

19. Prior to the assumption of power, there had been two rectification movements in Party history, in 1942-44 and in 1947-48. For a study of the 1942-44 rectification, see Boyd Compton, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44., Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1952. The 1952 rectification movement was aimed at the promotion of the fighting spirit in the Party and the study of administrative and organizational material.

- 45 to Party leaders,²⁰ The San Ch'a principle is employed by the Party as a means of eliminating undesirable members. San Ch'a can mean a check on work, work style, and ideology; it can also mean a check on viewpoint and personal history. During the Land Reform Movement, work, style, history, and class status constituted the three checks. This practice may not appear violent, but its psychological effect upon the individual is alarming.

Even the selection of Party members for further training can be used to eliminate undesirables, for it is a device to re-examine the qualifications of Party members; those who fail to pass the examination may be expelled. While rectification and overhauling are constant, the examination given four times a year increases the pressure upon Party members.

Because of the extreme weakness of the Party in the Southwest, no serious overhauling of Party organizations in this region

20. For detailed discussion of the eight conditions, consult Tzu-wen An, "Strengthen the Work of Party Reform and Party Expansion on the Foundation of Victory in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns," Current Background, No. 251, July 25, 1953, pp. 5-6.

- 665 took place prior to 1955. The reorganization of agricultural producers' co-operatives, which took place in 1955, was the first Party reform movement conducted in the Southwest.

G. Indoctrination and Training

Another way of maintaining Party unity and discipline is by the constant indoctrination and training of each member.²¹ This practice is aimed at the revitalization of adherence to Party doctrine.

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894 Southwest China maintains two schools, a cultural school to raise the general level of education and an ideological school to tighten adherence to doctrine.

In the country as a whole, one half of the cadres, most of them Party member, have less than a junior high school education,

21. Pamphlets published by the 6th Section of Kuomintang on Formosa relative to this subject are of interest: Fei-tang Hsün-lien Ti P'ou-shih [An Analytical Study of Indoctrination of the Communist Party of China], Taipei, 1952; Chung-kung Tang Ti tsu-chih yü K'ung-chih [Organization and Control of the Communist Party of China], Taipei, 1951.

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874 and some actually are illiterate.²² To remedy this, a cultural school system, administered by the Party and the government was established in this region in 1951, with the aim of raising the cadre standard to the junior high school level.²³ The course called for two semesters of twenty weeks, with four two-hour evening classes per week. In January 1954, a revised plan was ordered by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, establishing a nationwide system and bringing both individuals and the responsible secretaries below the county and ch'u levels into the new plan.²⁴ The plan called for cadre education equivalent to grade school and/or that of junior high school. Also included in the program, and to be completed in three or four months, was a class for the illiterate. Evening schools for the average cadre took twenty weeks at six hours a week. The secretaries and administrative personnel of the Party who were unable to take time off during the day for the supplementary

22. People's Daily, Jan. 22, 1954, p. 1.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

• 665 classes were expected to attend school in the evening.
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The purpose of the ideological school is to train Party members, candidates for membership, and leaders of mass organizations. Located in Chungking, the Southwestern ideological school is under the joint control of the Southwest Party Bureau and the Chungking Municipal Party Committee. Together with its 108 branch schools, it trained some 80,000 people in 1952. Instructors are trained in two special schools, where they study such things as Party history, the Party Constitution, and Soviet works on economic reconstruction.²⁵

H. Affiliated Party Organizations

668 The Party attempts to utilize the enthusiasm of youth through two organizations which, although not a part of the Party, are under its supervision: the New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC) and its subordinate group, the Young Pioneers, for youths aged

25. New China Daily, Jan. 17, 1953, p. 1.

668 the government's view and emphasizes the technique of self-criticism.

Communist control in the city is much more rigid and forceful than in the village. With the spread of Communist domination over many organizations, factories, and other professional organizations, Communist domination is strengthened. Although public security sub-stations play a leading role in enforcing government decrees, the importance of other organizations, notably the procuratorates and the People's courts, should not be minimized.

III. ELECTIONS AND POLITICS OF MINOR PARTIES

666A. Elections
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The nationwide election which produced the People's congresses at all levels was held in the Southwest between 1953 and July-August, 1954.

1. Election Mechanism. The Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China was

665 promulgated on March 1, 1953. 64 Article 3
666 stipulates that deputies to People's congresses
of a province, county, or municipality
divided into districts shall be elected by a like
People's congress of the next lower level.
Deputies to the People's congress of a hsiang,
town, municipal district, or municipality
divided into districts shall be elected directly
by the electors. To administer these elections,
the electoral law provides for the establish-
ment of election committees at all levels down
to the hsiang. Members of the committees are
appointed by the People's government of the
next higher level. The eight functions
assigned to the committee at the hsiang level
were reinforced by the directive issued in April
1953 by the Central Election Committee. 65
The chairman of the committee is appointed
from the higher level. The committee
defines electoral districts: each district consists

64. The Electoral Law of the People's
Republic of China for the All-China People's
Congresses and Local People's Congresses
of all Levels, Peking, Foreign Languages
Press, 1953.

65. For the eight functions of the
committee, see Article 39, ibid.

665 of at least 200 people, in order to supply two
666 or three representatives. A voter-qualification
examination board is established; only those
who pass the examination may receive the
electoral certificate. Committees at the
hsiang level directly control the selection of
candidates through negotiations between the
Party representatives and representatives of
mass organizations within the election
committee.

Although the election of the People's
congresses above the county level must be
conducted by secret ballot, the election of
deputies to the People's congresses of a
hsiang, town, municipal district, and the
election of hsiang or a town deputy may be
conducted by either secret ballot or a show
of hands (Article 55).

665 During the period prior to the general
208 elections of 1953 and 1954, the Party
666 accelerated its program of propaganda and
indoctrination. Every phase of the campaign
was designed to induce mass participation
and greater adherence to Communist values
and objectives. Szechwan was the center of
an especially intense propaganda campaign. 66

66. New China Daily, May 16, 1953, p. 1;
also May 30, 1953, p. 1.

• 665 Fifty nine thousand election handbooks were
666 distributed by some 180,000 specially trained
208 propagandists, many of them members of the
Szechwan Federation of Literature and Art
Circles. Among other devices used were 34
mobile motion picture projection teams,
400 slide-projector units, innumerable
"cultural" exhibits, and periodic radio
665 broadcasts. Election personnel were chosen
668 from various Party, governmental, and mass
organizations. Students also were widely used.
For example, in Kweichow some 400 students
of political science and law, together with
several hundred graduates of the Provincial
Institute of Nationalists, served as election
officers.⁶⁷

The result of the election was a foregone conclusion. In all provinces, between one-fourth and one-third of the deputies elected to the Provincial People's Congresses were members of the Communist Party.⁶⁸ Most non-Party deputies enthusiastically supported the Party's program. It would seem that, like most elections in Communist states, the general elections of 1953 and 1954 were

67. Ibid., May 19, 1953, p. 3.

68. People's Daily, March 21, 1954, p. 3;
also April 28, 1954, p. 3.

665 conducted in order to facilitate the indoctrination
666 of the masses, rather than to secure leaders
who enjoyed the support of the majority of the
electorate.

2. Selection and Nomination of Candidates.

Article 47 of the Electoral Law regulates the nomination of candidates. Members of the Communist Party of China, the various democratic parties, the various People's organizations, and electors or representatives who are not affiliated with the above-mentioned parties or organizations may be nominated as candidates for election as deputies, either jointly through negotiation among the groups or separately by each party, according to electoral districts and electoral units. In all cases, however, joint nomination is the rule and the caucus method is adopted. Negotiations on the nomination of candidates at the provincial or municipal level are made through the consultative conference of the level in question. At the county level or below, where such conferences do not exist, negotiations are carried out by the election committee. There is little doubt that the Communist Party of China commands the selection of candidates in the negotiations. At the hsiang level, a preliminary list of the candidates is given to the electors' discussion group for approval.

• 665 and returned to the election committee. The
666 final list is then published five days before the election.

3. Election Campaign and Fund. The practice of joint nomination of candidates usually eliminates the need for election campaigning. Candidates from other parties and organizations so selected must first meet the approval of the local Party organization; if they are approved, their election is assured. Any campaigning must take place only at the Party meeting and discussion group meetings, where candidates may be questioned and qualifications discussed. With respect to election expenses, Article 8 of the electoral law permits a disbursement from the national treasury. Since campaigning is rare, the collection of a campaign fund is not provided for. Article 62 singles out bribery as an offense. Other unlawful practices include violence, intimidation, and fraud. Offenders are subject to fine or imprisonment.

B. Politics of Minor Parties

After 1950, minor parties gradually re-established themselves in the key cities of Southwest China. The most noted are the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang,

665 the China Association for the Promotion of
666 Democracy, the Democratic League, the Chinese
Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party,
and the Chih Kung Tang.

The Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, composed of former Kuomintang officials, forms the largest group participating in government. The next largest is the Democratic League. As a party made up of the petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, it serves as a symbol of coalition. The China Association for the Promotion of Democracy is a party of the national bourgeoisie, including industrialists and capitalists. Its services are needed in the nation's economic programs. Minor parties having some political importance are drafted for other activities. Of special importance is the Chih Kung Tang, which, as an overseas Chinese political association, has been a major medium through which the Communists seek support from abroad.

The status of minor parties in this region is determined ultimately by their status in the central government -- a status which changed after the promulgation of the Constitution. While the Constitution still calls for the continued functioning of the People's

265 Democratic United Front led by the Communist
666 Party of China, the democratic groups of the
United Front are rapidly losing their identity.

The local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which are the organizational forms of the United Front, are no longer politically important. In 1951 their duties included assisting local governments, reflecting public opinion, examining decrees submitted by the government, and participating in government-sponsored drives. Article 18 of the Constitution has reduced them to advisory agencies.⁶⁹

It is true that minor parties may still participate in government affairs, either through the nomination of candidates to the People's congresses or through the local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; however, as the foregoing sections have indicated, the People's congresses and People's councils fail to provide for real popular participation. Equally significant is the reduction in the establishment of consultative committees below the provincial level. Prior to the

69. English text of the Constitution of the Chinese People's P.C.C. in Current Background, No. 309, Dec. 25, 1954.

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666 promulgation of the Constitution in September 1954, the establishment of these committees in administrative districts, cities, and counties was encouraged. The new Constitution only allows for the establishment of these committees in provinces and in municipalities directly under the central authority.

With the consolidation of Communist political power at all levels, the position of minor parties is further endangered. For instance, the liquidation of capitalists in the transitional stage certainly will reduce the power of the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy. Eventually, minor parties no longer will exist as political forces in the ordinary sense of the term, simply because they no longer will exert political influence.

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668 1. Control and Infiltration of Minor Parties. The most effective way of eliminating minor parties and their activities is to exercise strict control over them, either through direct subjugation or infiltration. The guiding principles to be observed by all minor parties participating in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

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665 indicates the degree to which these minor
668 parties have subordinated themselves to the Communist Party of China. Minor parties "must assist the state organs and set the social forces in motion ... to maintain close contact with the masses ... to continue to consolidate and develop the alliance between China and the U.S.S.R. and to study Marxist-Leninist theories on a voluntary basis, study state policy, elevate political levels, practice self-criticism and criticism, and strive for ideological remolding."

The Communist Party relies chiefly on infiltration to eliminate minor parties. Through the Party Committee's Department of the United Front, the Party maintains a close control over the policies and activities of the minor parties. Often it virtually dictates their policies. For example, the resolution on party expansion adopted by the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party in December 1951 authorized the appointment of Communist Party members to high posts within the organization. In addition, it forbade the establishment of party units in the countryside and excluded party activists from such organizations as the People's Liberation Army, the public security agencies, and intelligence units.

665 2. Minor Parties and "Pressure
668 Politics." In a democracy, the political activity of minor or opposition parties may indicate the measure of effective democracy. Likewise, special interest groups, as such, can enjoy their political privileges under democratic rule. In Communist China, since public opinion is controlled by the Communist Party, and since the minor parties have only assigned duties to perform, special interest groups and the dissident parties exert no "pressure" upon the state organizations dominated by the Party nor do they take part in the making of decisions.

Deputies of the minor parties were allowed to make speeches at the All-People's Conferences, but they limited themselves to praise, criticizing only those minor faults which the Communists themselves had admitted publicly.

Finally, with the retirement of aging leaders whose authority dates from the pre-Communist period, and with the absence of young and vigorous new members, the value of the minor parties is in rapid decline.

CONCLUSION

665 Since 1952 both the size and the influence of the Communist Party have increased

665 rapidly in Southwest China. By 1954 Party branches had been organized in 63 per cent of the hsiang, an increase of 900 per cent over 1952. Nevertheless, this abnormally rapid expansion merely reflects the original weakness of the Party in this region. In fact, as late as 1953, the Party had so little support among the mass of the peasants, that it had to use force to bring about the organization of agricultural producers' co-operatives.

The rapid growth of industry in the Southwest, together with the recent decision of the 6th Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Party to accelerate the organization of collective farms, will necessitate even greater Party expansion in the immediate future. Such expansion may well arouse unprecedented opposition, requiring violent methods of suppression similar to those employed in the Soviet Union in the 1920's.

578 process, each level of government has a particular target in mind and exerts influence on the next lower political echelon to achieve that objective. The result is an accumulation of pressure at the base of the political pyramid.

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466 In the economic field, each factory is given a production quota, assigned through a similar chain-of-command method. To fulfill the quota, every possible means of control is resorted to. The pressure engendered is constant. Both management and labor are held directly responsible for the attainment of assigned quotas. Failure to meet them means severe penalties. Recently, the Communists have attempted to improve their system of checking on the fulfillment of production quotas in order to eliminate the practice of submitting false reports of production achievements -- a strategy attempted in an effort to gain some temporary relief from mounting pressures.

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578 Within the Party itself, pressure and tension are most intense. In the first place, the Party apparatus as the center of power and activity of the regime is subject to pressure by both the Party and the state. Secondly,

• 665 Party members cannot escape the endless
578 program of Party indoctrination and
rectification. The dual pressures and resulting
tension are in large part responsible for the
high rate of expulsion and resignation from
the Party. Many people who are outwardly
in favor of the regime are reluctant to join
the Party. The fate of former Party members
after expulsion or resignation is not known,
but they are undoubtedly confined in prisons
or forced labor camps for some period of
time. If allowed to remain free or when
released, ex-members are probably subject
to security surveillance. However, they may
in time form a new subversive group.

668 Tension also exists in mass organizations
578 as the result of pressure imposed upon them
by the Party and higher organizations. The
broadest and also the most unstable mass
organizations are the Democratic Youth
Corps and the All-China Federation of Demo-
cratic Women. Lacking a common political,
economic, or community base, these
organizations are composed of heterogeneous
social and political elements, directly or
indirectly coerced into membership. These group
must be handled carefully. The key to pre-
venting tensions within an organization from